

# REMUNERATION POLICY APPROVED AT THE 2017 AGM

## Introduction

In accordance with the regulations, the Directors' Remuneration Policy (the Policy) as set out below will become formally effective at the Annual General Meeting on 15 November 2017 and is expected to apply for the period of three years from the date of approval.

## Policy summary

The Committee determines the Policy for the Chairman, executive directors and other senior executives for current and future years and this is reviewed on an annual basis. The Policy is designed to support the strategic objectives of the Company and to allow the business to attract, retain and motivate the quality of individuals needed to shape and execute the strategy and deliver shareholder value.

The Policy is designed around the following key principles:

- Ensure a strong link between reward and individual and Company performance to align the interests of senior executives with those of shareholders;
- Provide a balanced package with a focus on variable pay;
- Take into account the associated risks of each aspect of remuneration;
- Encourage a material, personal stake in the business and a long-term focus on sustained growth through long-term shareholding;
- Maintain a competitive package against businesses of a comparable size in the FTSE and comparable peer group businesses in the recruitment sector with reference to the breadth of the role and experience the role holder brings to the Company; and
- Operate a consistent reward and performance philosophy throughout the business.

The Committee considers that a successful Policy needs to be sufficiently flexible to take account of future changes in the Company's business environment and in remuneration practice.

## Discretion

The Committee has discretion in several areas of policy as set out in this Report. The Committee may also exercise operational and administrative discretions under relevant plan rules approved by shareholders as set out in those rules. In addition, the Committee has the discretion to amend the Policy with regard to minor or administrative matters where it would be, in the opinion of the Committee, disproportionate to seek or await shareholder approval.

## Prior commitments

The Committee reserves the right to make any remuneration payments and/or payments for loss of office (including the exercise of any discretions available to it in connection with such payments) notwithstanding that they are not in line with the Policy where the terms of the payment were (i) agreed before 12 November 2014 (when the Company's first shareholder-approved Directors' Remuneration Policy came into effect); (ii) before the Policy came into effect, provided that the terms of the payment were consistent with the shareholder-approved Directors' Remuneration Policy in force at the time they were agreed; and (iii) at a time when the individual to whom the payment is made was not a director of the Company and, in the opinion of the Committee, the payment was not in consideration for the individual becoming a director of the Company. For these purposes, 'payments' include the Committee satisfying awards of variable remuneration and, in relation to an award over shares, the terms of the payment are agreed at the time the award is granted.

## Differences in policy from the wider employee population

The Group aims to provide a remuneration package for all employees that is market competitive and consistent. Employees receive base salary and benefits and may receive bonus, pension and share awards with levels varying depending on the individual's location, seniority and responsibilities. Salary increases for executive directors are generally in line with those for UK-based employees.

## Remuneration structure (policy table)

### Elements of executive director remuneration package

Element	Objective and link to the strategy	Operation	Maximum potential value	Performance conditions and assessment
<b>Base salary</b>	<p>Base salary recognises individual contribution, changes in responsibilities and competitive market rates.</p> <p>Provides a base level of remuneration to support recruitment and retention of directors with the necessary experience and expertise to deliver the Group's strategy.</p> <p>Key element of core fixed remuneration.</p>	<p>Base salary is normally set annually on 1 July.</p> <p>When determining the base salary of the executive directors the Committee takes into consideration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The levels of base salary for similar positions with comparable status, responsibility and skills in organisations of broadly similar size and complexity;</li> <li>– The comparator groups currently include the FTSE 250, the companies in the Company's Total Shareholder Return (TSR) comparator group used for PSP awards and UK companies of a similar size and complexity. The Committee intends to review the comparator groups each year and may add or remove companies from the group as it considers appropriate. Any changes made in future to the comparator group will be disclosed to shareholders in setting out the operation of the policy for the subsequent year in the section headed Implementation of Remuneration Policy in the Following Financial Year;</li> </ul>	<p>Whilst there is no prescribed maximum level of salary, increases will normally be in line with the market and the average base pay increase for other employees in the UK.</p> <p>Higher levels of increases may be made where there is a significant change to the individual's responsibilities or where there is significant difference to the market, for example in case of individuals who are recruited, or promoted to the Board who may, on occasion, have their salaries set below the targeted policy level until they become established in their role. In such cases subsequent increases in salary may be higher than the average until the target positioning is achieved.</p> <p>The Company will normally set out in the section headed Implementation of Remuneration Policy in the Following Financial Year the salaries for that year for each of the executive directors (see page 87).</p>	N/A

### Elements of executive director remuneration package (continued)

Element	Objective and link to the strategy	Operation	Maximum potential value	Performance conditions and assessment
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The performance of the individual executive director;</li> <li>- The individual executive director's experience and responsibilities; and</li> <li>- Pay and conditions throughout the Company. The Committee has access to pay and conditions of other employees within the Group when determining remuneration for the executive directors and also considers the relationship between general changes to pay and conditions within the Group as a whole.</li> </ul>		
<b>Annual bonus</b>	<p>To align reward to key annual objectives relating to the Group's financial performance and operational strength.</p> <p>The three-year deferral into shares aligns the interests of executive directors with those of shareholders and also assists with their retention.</p>	<p>50% of bonus earned will be paid in cash and 50% deferred into shares for three years under the deferred annual bonus plan (the DAB).</p> <p>Malus and Clawback provisions may be applied in case of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material misstatement resulting in an adjustment to the audited accounts;</li> <li>- Incorrect assessment of any performance conditions or award calculations due to an error or misleading information; and</li> <li>- Fraud and Gross misconduct.</li> </ul> <p>Malus provisions allow the Committee to reduce or eliminate share awards granted under DAB.</p> <p>Discretion may also be exercised in cases where the Committee believes that the bonus outcome is not a fair and accurate reflection of business performance.</p> <p>The Committee has discretion to reduce the number of shares vesting if the underlying financial performance of the Company is not satisfactory over the three-year deferral period.</p> <p>The Company operates in a rapidly changing sector and therefore the Committee may change the balance of the measures, or use different measures for subsequent financial years, as appropriate, to reflect this provided that at least 80% are normally based on financial performance.</p> <p>The Company will disclose the nature of the targets and their weightings at the end of each year in the relevant Annual Report on Remuneration. The performance conditions, targets, weightings and their level of satisfaction for the year being reported on, are contained in the Annual Report on Remuneration on page 74.</p> <p>The Committee retains discretion in exceptional circumstances to change the performance measures and targets and their respective weightings part way through a performance year if there is a significant and material event which causes the Committee to believe the original measures, weightings and targets are no longer appropriate. Discretion may also be exercised in cases where the Committee believes that the bonus outcome is not a fair and accurate reflection of business performance.</p> <p>Dividend equivalents may be provided on deferred shares.</p>	<p>Maximum 150% of base salary.</p> <p>Threshold level of performance earns 24% of salary based on achieving threshold EPS and cash conversion. Zero payment for below threshold performance.</p>	<p>The current bonus performance conditions are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Earnings per share;</li> <li>- Cash conversion; and</li> <li>- Personal objectives.</li> </ul> <p>The Remuneration Committee is of the opinion that given the commercial sensitivity arising in relation to the detailed financial targets used for the annual bonus, disclosing precise targets for the bonus plan in advance would not be in shareholder interests. This avoids the risk of the Company inadvertently providing a profit forecast, because profit targets are linked to budgets, and giving competitors an unfair advantage because they are not required to report to the same disclosure standard as a UK-listed company. Actual targets, performance achieved and awards made will be published at the end of the performance periods so shareholders can fully assess the basis for any payouts under the annual bonus.</p>

## REMUNERATION REPORT CONTINUED

## Elements of executive director remuneration package

Element	Objective and link to the strategy	Operation	Maximum potential value	Performance conditions and assessment
<b>Performance Share Plan (PSP) award</b>	To incentivise the delivery of sustained long-term performance and align with share price and dividend growth over the long-term.	<p>In accordance with plan rules, PSP awards are granted annually and vesting is dependent on the achievement of performance conditions.</p> <p>Awards are subject to a two-year Holding Period.</p> <p>Malus provisions may be applied during the Performance Period and Clawback provisions may be applied during the Holding Period in case of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Material misstatement resulting in an adjustment to the audited accounts;</li> <li>– Incorrect assessment of any performance conditions or award calculations due to an error or misleading information; and</li> <li>– Fraud and Gross misconduct.</li> </ul> <p>Reviewed annually to ensure that grant levels, performance criteria and other features remain appropriate to the Company's current circumstances, and to ensure that there are no features of the plan that could inadvertently motivate irresponsible behaviour.</p> <p>Dividend equivalents may be provided on released shares.</p>	<p>Normal awards will be 150% of base salary for executive directors with absolute maximum of 200% of base salary in exceptional circumstances.</p> <p>Maximum and threshold vesting levels for performance conditions are 100% and 25% respectively.</p>	<p>Performance period of three financial years.</p> <p>The performance conditions will be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 30% based on cumulative earnings per share;</li> <li>– 50% based on cumulative cash conversion; and</li> <li>– 20% based on total shareholder return relative to the comparator group with vesting subject to satisfactory financial performance over the period, as determined by the Committee. <p>The Company operates in a rapidly changing sector and therefore the Committee may change the balance of the measures, or use different measures for subsequent awards, as appropriate. No material change will be made to the type of performance condition without prior shareholder consultation.</p> <p>Details of the performance conditions for grants made in the year will be set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration.</p> </li></ul>
<b>Pension allowance</b>	To provide a competitive retirement benefit.	<p>Company pension contribution or salary supplement in lieu of pension contributions.</p> <p>Salary supplements will not be included in calculating any benefit based on salary including the levels under the Company's incentive arrangements.</p>	Maximum 30% of base salary for current directors. As outlined in the recruitment section, new directors will receive up to 15% of base salary.	N/A
<b>Other benefits</b>	To provide competitive employment benefits.	<p>Benefits will generally include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Car benefit or equivalent;</li> <li>– Private medical insurance;</li> <li>– Permanent health insurance; and</li> <li>– Life assurance.</li> </ul> <p>The level of benefits provided is reviewed every year to ensure it remains market competitive.</p> <p>Other benefits may be provided if considered reasonable and appropriate (e.g. in case of relocation).</p>	The maximum will be set at the cost of providing the listed benefits. For example, current car allowance is £18-20,000 p.a.	N/A
<b>Shareholding policy</b>	To ensure that executive directors' interests are aligned with those of shareholders over a longer time horizon.	<p>The Committee requires the Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer to build and maintain a material shareholding in the Company of at least two-times base salary over a reasonable time frame, which would normally be five years.</p> <p>Only shares which are beneficially owned by the executives or subject to a holding period count towards this requirement.</p> <p>The Committee has discretion to increase the shareholding requirement.</p>	N/A	N/A
<b>Sharesave Schemes</b>	To encourage wide employee share ownership and thereby align employees' interests with shareholders.	<p>The Company operates Sharesave Schemes in which the executive directors are eligible to participate (which in the UK is HMRC approved and is open to all eligible staff in the UK).</p> <p>The Company retains the discretion to introduce additional plans, and to make directors eligible for these as appropriate.</p>	<p>UK scheme in line with HMRC limits as amended from time to time.</p> <p>Overseas schemes broadly in line with UK values.</p>	There are no performance conditions, in line with HMRC requirements, other than the inherent share price growth required to receive a benefit.

### Non-executive director remuneration

Element	Objective and link to the strategy	Operation	Maximum potential value	Performance conditions and assessment
<b>Non-executive director fees</b>	Competitive fees for Chairman and non-executive directors with the necessary skills and experience to advise and assist with establishing and monitoring the Group's strategic objectives.	<p>The remuneration of the non-executive directors is determined by the Board annually.</p> <p>The responsibility of the role and international nature of the Group are fully considered when setting the fee levels, along with external benchmarking market data on the chairmanship of, and participation in, Board committees. The comparator groups used are consistent with those used for the executive directors.</p> <p>The non-executive directors' fees are non-pensionable and non-executive directors are not eligible to participate in any incentive plans.</p>	<p>The fees are set normally around the median compared to the Company's comparator groups and will be within the Articles of Association limits.</p> <p>Additional fees are paid to individuals chairing a committee and to the Senior Independent Director.</p> <p>The non-executive directors' fees are non-pensionable and non-executive directors are not eligible to participate in any incentive plans.</p> <p>The Chairman and non-executive directors will be reimbursed by the Company for all reasonable expenses incurred in performing their duties. This may include costs associated with travel where required and any tax liabilities payable.</p>	None

#### Notes to the policy table:

The Committee believes that incentive metrics should be simple and aligned with the delivery of the annual business plan and with long-term sustainable growth.

The three main measures currently used are EPS, Cash Conversion and relative TSR, with a clear focus on annual profit growth in the Annual Bonus Plan and main emphasis on long-term cash generation in the PSP.

- (1) EPS metric is a key performance measure aligned with shareholder interests.
- (2) Cash Conversion promotes sustained free cash flow and is a key indicator of ongoing operational cash efficiency.
- (3) The Annual Bonus includes an element of Personal Objectives linked to the delivery of key projects designed to enhance the Group's operational strength and competitiveness in line with future strategy.
- (4) Relative TSR is a measure favoured by a number of shareholders and provides for reward for outperformance of a number of comparators.

#### The current constituents of the Company's TSR comparator group are shown below:

- Adecco SA
- Kelly Services Inc
- Manpower Inc
- Page Group plc (previously Michael Page International plc)
- Randstad Holdings NV
- Robert Half International Inc
- Robert Walters plc
- SThree plc

The peer group has been chosen to reflect most closely the mix of the Company's business.

Awards under any of the Company's share plans referred to in this report may:

- (a) Be granted as conditional share awards or nil-cost options or in such other form that the Committee determines has the same economic effect;
- (b) Have any performance condition applicable to them amended by the Committee if the Committee determines that it has ceased to be a fair measure of performance provided that the amended condition is not, in the Committee's reasonable opinion, materially less difficult to satisfy;
- (c) Incorporate the right to receive an amount (in cash or additional shares) equal to the value of dividends which would have been paid on the shares under an award that vest until the award is satisfied. This amount may be calculated assuming that the dividends have been reinvested in the Company's shares on a cumulative basis;
- (d) Be settled in cash at the Committee's discretion; and
- (e) Be adjusted in the event of any variation of the Company's share capital or any demerger, capital distribution or other event that may materially impact the Company's share price.

## REMUNERATION REPORT CONTINUED

### Service contracts

The Committee's policy for setting notice periods is that a maximum 12-month period will apply for executive directors. The Committee may in exceptional circumstances arising on recruitment, allow a longer period, which would in any event reduce to 12 months following the first year of employment.

In the event of early termination of a director's service contract, the Company would be required to pay compensation reflecting the salary, pension allowance and benefits to which the director would have become entitled under the contract during the notice period. Alternatively, the Company may, at its discretion, pay a predetermined sum in lieu of notice. In the event of early termination, the Committee will give careful consideration to what compensation should be paid, taking into account the circumstances and the responsibility of the individual to mitigate loss.

The contract of the Chief Executive was agreed prior to 27 June 2012 and includes in his sum in lieu of notice an amount equal to his on-target bonus pro-rated for time. All future contracts will contain a 'PILON' clause based purely on salary, pension allowance and benefits with payments staged over the notice period and an obligation to mitigate loss.

	Current contract start date	Unexpired term	Notice period from Company	Notice period from executive
Alistair Cox	September 2007	Indefinite	One-year	One-year
Paul Venables	May 2006	Indefinite	One-year	Six months

The non-executive directors do not have service contracts with the Company, but are appointed to the Board under letters of appointment for an initial three-year period. They have agreed to annual retirement and reappointment by shareholders at the Company's annual general meeting and, with the exception of the Chairman, appointments can be terminated immediately by the Company. Letters of appointment are available for review from the Company Secretary and a pro forma letter of appointment can be viewed on the Company's website [haysplc.com](http://haysplc.com). Susan Murray and Andrew Martin were appointed to the Board and Remuneration Committee on 12 July 2017.

Non-executive director	Date appointed to the Board	Date of current letter of appointment	Notice period
Alan Thomson	1 October 2010	14 July 2010 (Renewed)	Three months
Peter Williams	24 February 2015	24 February 2015	None
Paul Harrison	8 May 2007	31 August 2011	None
Victoria Jarman	1 October 2011	31 August 2011	None
Torsten Kreindl	1 June 2013	30 May 2013	None
MT Rainey	14 December 2015	14 December 2015	None
Pippa Wicks	1 January 2012	30 November 2011	None

### Payments to departing directors

The Committee will honour executive directors' contractual entitlements. Service contracts do not contain liquidated damages clauses. If a contract is to be terminated, the Committee will determine such mitigation as it considers fair and reasonable in each case. There are no contractual arrangements that would guarantee a pension with limited or no abatement on severance or early retirement. There is no agreement between the Company and its directors providing for compensation for loss of office or employment that occurs because of a takeover bid. The Committee reserves the right to make any other payments in connection with a director's cessation of office or employment where such payments are made in good faith in discharge of an existing legal obligation (or by way of damages for breach of such an obligation); or by way of settlement or compromise of any claim arising in connection with the termination of an executive director's office or employment or for any fees or outplacement assistance and/or the director's legal and/or professional advice fees in connection with his cessation of office or employment.

When determining any payment for a departing individual the Committee will always seek to minimise cost to the Company while seeking to address the circumstances at the time.

The table below shows the approach the Committee will apply in respect of base salary, benefits and pension in respect of departing directors.

Component	Approach	Application of Remuneration Committee Discretion
Base salary, benefits and pension	In the event of termination by the Company, there will be no compensation for departure due to misconduct.  In other circumstances, executive directors may be entitled to receive payment in lieu of notice. Payment in lieu of notice will be equivalent to the salary payments, benefit value and pension contributions that they would have received if still employed by the Company for a maximum of 12 months.	None
Other contractual obligations	There are no other contractual provisions other than those set out above agreed prior to 27 June 2012.	N/A

The rules of the Performance Share Plan and the Deferred Annual Bonus (DAB) set out the treatment of specific categories of leavers as set out in the table below. In other cases where an executive leaves employment during the DAB period or during the PSP Performance Period, the Committee will consider the specific details of each case before determining whether to award Good Leaver status. The Committee will provide a full explanation to shareholders when it is determined that an executive director is a Good Leaver. The Committee is unequivocally against rewards for failure.

Category	Cash Annual Bonus	DAB (Deferred Bonus Shares)	PSP
Injury/Ill-health/Disability	Bonus paid at normal time, subject to performance with pro-rating for time.	Awards vest in full at normal vesting date.	To the extent that performance conditions are met, awards are pro-rated for service during the performance period and released at the vesting date.
Death, or sale of employing entity out of the Group	Bonus paid immediately based on estimated performance with pro-rating for time.	Awards vest in full on cessation of employment.	To the extent that performance conditions are met, awards are pro-rated for service during the performance period but released early.
Change of control	Bonus payment subject to pro-rating for time and performance.	Immediate vesting of awards in full in accordance with plan rules.	In accordance with the plan rules, where no replacement award, there will be early vesting of awards pro-rated for service during the performance period and performance.

**Notes:**

- (1) It should be noted that shares vesting under the DAB rules are shares related to previously earned bonus and therefore the performance conditions for the relevant annual bonus had to be met before the shares were awarded.
- (2) Under the DAB rules the Committee has the discretion to allow the award to vest early in 'exceptional circumstances' following cessation of employment as a good leaver. It is anticipated that this would only apply in the case of death in service.
- (3) The Committee has discretion under the rules of the PSP to bring forward the date of vesting for a good leaver to the date of the cessation of employment subject to the award being pro-rated for time during the performance period and to the extent that performance is met. It is not the current intention of the Committee to use this discretion.
- (4) Any shares in the PSP Holding Period would be released upon an executive leaving Hays for reason other than Gross Misconduct and would be subject to any Clawback provisions prior to release. Clawback provisions would continue to apply after release until the end of the normal Holding Period timeframe.
- (5) In the event that the Committee determines Good Leaver status to be applicable, it may impose certain conditions for an executive receiving shares under DAB or PSP on cessation of employment.
- (6) Executives would be treated in accordance with the scheme rules in respect of the HMRC approved Hays Sharesave.

## REMUNERATION REPORT CONTINUED

The Chairman and non-executive directors do not have service contracts but instead have letters of appointment. On termination, they are only entitled to accrued fees to the date of termination.

### Setting payments for new appointments

The Company's principle is the remuneration of any new recruit will be assessed in line with the same principles for the executive directors, as set out in the remuneration policy table above. The Committee's approach to recruitment remuneration is to pay no more than is necessary to attract candidates of the appropriate calibre and experience needed for the role from the international market in which the Company competes.

The Remuneration Committee will not pay more than it considers necessary to secure the preferred candidate and will have regard to guidelines and shareholder sentiment regarding one-off or enhanced short-term or long-term incentive payments made on recruitment and the appropriateness of any performance measures associated with an award.

The table below summarises the Company's key policies with respect to recruitment remuneration for executive directors:

Component	Policy
Base salary, benefits and pension	<p>The salary level will be set taking into account a number of factors including market practice, the individual's experience and responsibilities and other pay structures within the Company and will be consistent with the salary policy for executive directors.</p> <p>The executive director shall be eligible to receive benefits in line with the Company's benefits policy as set out in the remuneration policy table.</p>
Pension	A pension allowance of up to 15% of base salary. The Company may choose to give part or all as a cash allowance rather than pay into a Group pension fund. Normal payroll deductions (for example income tax and National Insurance/social security) will be deducted from the gross cash allowance.
Annual Bonus (and Deferred Bonus)	<p>An executive director will be eligible to participate in the annual bonus arrangements as set out in the remuneration policy table.</p> <p>For the first year only, the Committee retains the discretion to set performance conditions in the context of the business priorities on joining and the time frame available to year end.</p> <p>Awards may be granted up to the maximum opportunity allowable in the remuneration policy table at the Committee's discretion.</p>
Performance Share Plan	An executive director will be eligible to participate in the PSP as set out in the remuneration policy table. Awards may be granted up to the maximum opportunity allowable under plan rules at the Committee's discretion.
Share buy-outs/ replacement awards	<p>The Committee's policy is not to provide buy-outs as a matter of course.</p> <p>However, should the Committee determine that the individual circumstances of recruitment justified the provision of a buy-out, the value of any incentives that will be forfeited on cessation of a director's previous employment will be calculated taking into account the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The proportion of the performance period completed on the date of the director's cessation of employment;</li> <li>- The performance conditions attached to the vesting of these incentives and the likelihood of them being satisfied; and</li> <li>- Any other terms and condition having a material effect on their value (lapsed value).</li> </ul> <p>The Committee may then grant up to the equivalent value as the lapsed value, where possible, under the Company's incentive plans. To the extent that it was not possible or practical to provide the buy-out within the terms of the Company's existing incentive plans, a bespoke arrangement would be used.</p>
Relocation policies	<p>In instances where the new executive director is expected to relocate, the Company will provide one-off/ongoing payment(s) as part of the relocation benefits compensation.</p> <p>The level of relocation package will be assessed on a case by case basis but will take into consideration any differences in the cost of living/housing/schooling.</p>


Where an existing employee is promoted to the Board, the policy set out above would apply from the date of promotion but there would be no retrospective application of the policy in relation to subsisting incentive awards or remuneration arrangements. Accordingly, prevailing elements of the remuneration package for an existing employee would be honoured and form part of the ongoing remuneration of the person concerned. These would be disclosed to shareholders in the Annual Remuneration Report for the relevant financial year.

The annual fees payable to newly recruited non-executive directors will be in line with the fees payable to existing non-executive directors.




### Remuneration scenario graphs for executive directors

The charts opposite illustrate the remuneration that would be paid to each of the executive directors, based on salaries at the start of financial year 2018, under three different performance scenarios: (i) Minimum; (ii) On-target; and (iii) Maximum. The elements of remuneration have been categorised into three components: (i) Fixed; (ii) Annual Bonus; and (iii) PSP.



### Value of package (£'000)



Each element of remuneration is defined in the table below:

Element	Description
Fixed	Total amount of salary and pension in respect of the 2018 financial year and benefits as disclosed under the FY17 single figure.
Annual Bonus	Money or other assets received or receivable where performance measures relate to one financial year, i.e. annual bonus payments.
PSP	Money or other assets received or receivable where performance measures relate to more than one financial year, i.e. PSP payments.

Assumptions used in determining the level of payout under given scenarios are as follows:

- Minimum performance scenario assumes fixed pay only and no variable payments under the annual bonus and PSP;
- On-target performance scenario assumes performance in line with the Company's expectations, resulting in 93.8% base salary payout in respect of the PSP (62.5% of maximum award of 150% of base salary) and 90% base salary payout in respect of the annual bonus (60% of maximum bonus of 150%). There is no formal on-target figure for the PSP, 62.5% is midway between the 25% threshold and the maximum, based on an award of 150% of basic salary; and
- Maximum performance scenario assumes outstanding level of performance, resulting in 150% base salary payout in respect of the PSP and 150% base salary payout in respect of the annual bonus.

In accordance with the regulations share price growth has not been included. In addition, dividend equivalents have not been added to deferred share bonus and PSP share awards.

### Statement of conditions elsewhere in the group

Each year, prior to reviewing the remuneration of the executive directors and the members of the Management Board, the Committee considers a report prepared by the Group Head of Reward detailing remuneration practice across the Group. The report provides a regional overview of how employee pay compares to the market, any material changes during the year and includes detailed analysis of basic pay and variable pay changes within the UK where all of the executive directors and most of the Management Board are based. While the Company does not directly consult with employees as part of the process of reviewing executive pay and formulating the remuneration policy set out in this report, the Company does receive an update and feedback from the broader employee population on an annual basis using an engagement survey which includes a number of questions relating to remuneration.

The Company does not use remuneration comparison measurements.

### Consideration of shareholder views

The Committee takes the views of the shareholders seriously and these views are taken into account in shaping and reviewing remuneration policy and practice. Shareholder views are considered when evaluating and setting remuneration strategy and the Committee commits to consulting with key shareholders prior to any significant changes to its remuneration policy.

In line with this commitment the Committee consulted this year with shareholders on the rebalancing of the Annual Bonus and PSP and the reweighting of the performance measures in the PSP. The Committee is grateful for the comments and feedback. At the end of this process the Remuneration Committee is pleased that a strong majority of shareholders consulted have indicated they are supportive of the changes to the Plans.

The reweighting of the financial measures more clearly differentiates the role of these measures in the annual bonus and PSP with now a clearer focus on profit in the bonus and sustainable cash generation in the PSP which mitigates some comments we had received in previous years regarding the use of the same measures in both plans. Our shareholders have mixed views on relative TSR. We have retained this measure although acknowledge the reduction in the peer group over time given consolidation in the industry and the challenge in determining a relevant peer group even in the same industry given the differences in business model and the countries that recruitment companies operate in. As a result, the Committee determined to reduce its weighting.

The reduction in pension provision for future directors was notably a result of us monitoring emerging views of shareholders on specific aspects of the Policy.